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PETROLEUM IN PERSPECTIVE*
By

HARRY R. JOHNSONt
ABSTRACT
The environment that surrounds the petroleum industry is a complex mixture of economics, technology, and public policy. In the
1950's, the historical relationships between these factors were upset
by the widespread application of technology. Because of technology,
it became profitable for individual firms to make significant operating changes, which are reflected in a sharply falling balance between
domestic supply and demand.
The analysis in this article indicates that a new supply-demand
maintenance level will be reached within the next few years. Efforts
to maintain this level will be reflected by upswings in exploratory
drilling, increased application of secondary recovery technology, and
initial attempts to extract liquids from supplemental sources as coal,
oil shale, and tar sands. All foreseeable needs for petroleum will be
satisfied, but short-run pressure may be created for a higher real price
of oil and/or increased imports.
Agitation is high to reform public policies that control a substantial portion of petroleum activity. But policy reform cannot be
effective if it is a haphazard, uncoordinated activity. Instead, it must
proceed simultaneously along several fronts. Failure to do so may
lead to a dangerous over-correction of the future balance between
supply and demand.
Early studies of petroleum contain ominous predictions concerning the exhaustion of this resource. Of course, these predictions never
came true. The record shows that since the 1930's and up until the
very recent past, the supplies of petroleum as measured against its
demand have remained nearly constant.
In the 1950's and 1960's, however, significant operating changes
were made by petroleum firms. The individual actions of these firms
are reflected in a sharply falling balance between domestic supply
and demand. The severity of the decline has evoked growing concern
tPetroleum and Natural Gas Engineer, Office of the Chief, Division of Petroleum and
Natural Gas, Bureau of Mines, U.S. Department of the Interior, Washington, D.C.
*This article was completed at the University of Washington, Seattle, Wash., under the
1968-69 Career Education Fellowship program granted by the National Institute of Public
Affairs. Although the concepts contained herein were shaped by many people, the author
feels especially indebted to Professors James A. Crutchfield, Economics, Robert H. Pealy,
Public Affairs, and Richard A. Cooley, Geography; all of whom are at the University of
Washington.
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among petroleum analysts, and in 1965 a major Government report
on petroleum was released that stated ".

.

. [W]hat has been done

since 1956 to find new supplies of oil... has not been enough to
provide a sound basis for future growth. Additional exploratory
effort is needed,.

. ."'

But the supply-demand trend continued

downward.
Another, more comprehensive, report on petroleum was released 3
years later. The "summary & conclusions" section of the report contains the following:
It therefore appears that the discovery rate since 1957 will not be
sufficient to offset withdrawals from proved reserves between 1965
and 1980 on the basis of anticipated recovery rates. Specifically,
* either the recovery rate must improve faster than the 0.5 percent
annual improvement projected, or
* Discoveries must be increased above the levels that have prevailed
since 1957.2
That a fundamental change is or has occurred is not to be disputed. But why were these changes made in the face of huge future
demands for petroleum? Have we at last dipped too deeply into our
supplies of this non-renewable resource? Can we supply our future
needs?
Yes, we will be able to supply all needs into the foreseeable future.
The real question relates to the price required to make it profitable
to produce these supplies. Why the changes were made is also related
to economics. And economics, in turn, is inextricably bound to technology and energy policy. This article explores the interrelationships
between economics, technology, and policy to place petroleum in
perspective.
I
DEMAND PATTERNS

Private firms, industry associations, and government attempt to
estimate future demand-supply relationships for petroleum. Projections of demand provide the basis for rational judgments concerning
acequacy of supply and future costs. Common to all projections are
assumptions concerning the general economic climate, the political
environment, and the pace and direction of technological changes.
Short-run projections of a few years tend to be fairly accurate
since petroleum demand has exhibited a long-run growth rate of 3 to
4 percent per year, although this rate in recent years has been higher.
1. U.S. Department of the Interior, An Appraisal of the Petroleum Industry of the
United States, at 17 (1965).
2. U.S. Department of the Interior, U.S. Petroleum Through 1980 at vii (1968).

January 19711

PETROLEUM IN PERSPECTIVE

In addition, petroleum consumption today is the result of decisions
that were made several years ago. The current production runs of
automobiles, for example, are the products of a complicated scheduling process that was initiated 3 years earlier. Changes in the price of
petroleum or in technology will not, in the short run, drastically alter
petroleum consumption.
Long-run projections for any energy commodity are subject to
many influences. Among these are price, interfuel competition, consumer preferences, technological changes, government policy, and a
growing effort to provide a cleaner environment. The longer range
projections have tended to underestimate technological changes and
ignore institutional factors.
These limitations cannot be completely overcome, but it is
possible to place boundaries on the etimates. One recent study of all
of the energy commodities 3 uses both sensitivity analysis and the
relatively new concept of contingency analysis to set these boundaries. This study utilizes standard economic techniques to project the
"best" or medium estimate of demand to 1980. How sensitive the
estimates are to changes in such key variables as gross national
product and population growth is then determined. Sensitivity
analysis does not alter the percentage of total energy supplied by
each commodity, only the absolute amounts.
Contingency analysis attempts to formulate and quantify reasonable events that could change the amounts of energy supplied by
each commodity. For example, if low-sulfur oil is not available and
technology cannot advance fast enough to permit the economic removal of sulfur from oil, it is reasonable to expect natural gas or
other fuel commodities to gradually replace oil in areas suffering
from polluted air. The increase in gas usage and decrease in oil was
examined for the New York, Chicago, and Philadelphia marketing
areas. Other contingencies studied were reduced and increased oil
imports. The electric car and other alternatives to the internal combustion engine are not expected to pose a threat to the gasoline
market between now and 1980.' A contingency not studied was how
an increase in the price of petroleum relative to other energy commodities would effect oil consumption. Such an increase is a real
short run possibility, as discussed later in this article.
The standard projection of energy use patterns provides the
medium projection while sensitivity and contingency analysis serve
3. Morrison and Readling, An Energy Model for the United States, FeaturingEnergy
Balances for the Years 1947 to 1965 and Projectionsand Forecasts to the Years 1980 and
2000, U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines Information Circular 8384 (1968).
4. U.S. Department of Commerce, The Automobile and Air Pollution: A Programfor
Progress (1967).
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to bracket this projection with boundary conditions. For petroleum,
the domestic oil required to meet future needs is given in Table 1.
The nation in the 15-year period 1965-80 is expected to consume
about 80 billion barrels of oil, 56 billion from domestic sources and
the balance from imports. Total consumption will be about as much
as the nation consumed during the previous 100 years. Concern is
evident over the industry's ability to meet these enormous requirements in the face of a falling balance between domestic supply and
demand.
TABLE 1
Demand for Domestic Petroleum, 1965 and 1980 Projected

1965
High
Medium
Low

1980

Million bbl/day

Billion bbl/year

Million bbl/day

Billion bbl/year

7.8

2.849

15.1
12.7
10.3

5.520
4.645
3.752

Source: Warren E. Morrison and Charles L. Readling, An Energy Model for the United
States, FeaturingEnergy Balancesfor the Years 1947 to 1965 and Projectionsand Forecasts
to the Years 1980 and 2000, U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines Information

Circular 8384 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968).

II
SUPPLY PATTERNS
The amount of any commodity that can be made available to any
buyer is directly related to the price the buyer is willing to pay for it.
In any analysis of supply, therefore, price is a key variable.
A. Price
Price stability of domestic oil has been a characteristic of the
petroleum industry over the years. This is readily discernible in
Figure 1 where actual and adjusted prices are plotted against time.
For the purpose of comparison, the price adjusted for inflation is the
more important for it shows how many 1965 dollars would have
been required to purchase 1 barrel of oil at any time in the 1951-65
period.
The average price in 1965 dollars over the full 15-year period has
been $2.98 per barrel, with price swings around the average confined
to within $0.21 per barrel. The extremes, therefore, deviate from the
average by only about 7 percent over the entire period.
This remarkable stabilization of prices is the result of many factors. Among the most important of these are the restriction of
5. Deflated by wholesale price index for petroleum as compiled by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics.
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Figure 1.
HISTORICAL PRICES OF CRUDE OIL
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foreign oil imports and compulsory prorationing of oil. Each of these
programs limits supply and, therefore, tends to support the price.
Another factor is technological advances that have offset large increases in the real costs of labor, oilfield machinery, and casing. The
saving due to advances in technology during 1950-65 has been estimated to be about $1 per barrel.6
Prices fell slowly between 1962 and 1965 and then began to
gradually inch upward. By early 1969, price jumps of up to $0.20
per barrel to the $3.00 to $3.10 level were made, bringing oil close to
its 1957 peak price.
B. Supply, 1965
Most discussions of supply seem to center on the "proved reserves" concept as defined by the American Petroleum Institute
(API). 7 This is natural since the concept has been used since 1936
6. National Petroleum Council, impact of New Technology on The U.S. Petroleum Industry 1946-1965, part 1 (1967).

7. American Petroleum Institute, Reserves of Crude Oil, Natural Gas Liquids and Natural
Gas in the United States and Canada, as of December 31, 1966, Oil Information Bulletin,
No. 21 (1967).
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when the API first began to publish its annual evaluation of the
nation's reserve position.
Underlying the "reserve" concept are a number of assumptions
and limitations which have been adequately discussed.' The concept
applies only to those quantities of oil that have been discovered and
can be economically produced using installed equipment or technology that has been pilot tested in that field. In a real sense, "proved
reserves" represent the product inventory of the petroleum industry
at any given time, just as the amount of goods in a retail store
represents the product inventory of that store. This working inventory of petroleum has been nearly constant over the period 1956-65,
ranging from 30.3 to 31.7 billion barrels.
The Interstate Oil Compact Commission (IOCC) has extended the
concept of recoverable reserves. 9 It periodically estimates the
amount of petroleum that could be produced by secondary recovery
if such techniques were actually applied to known oilfields.1 0 In
addition, it estimates the oil that could physically be recovered from
those fields if cost were not a factor. This oil could be economically
recovered if the price of oil were to increase.1 1 The IOCC does not
attempt to apply price to its estimates, but reasonable estimates of
price can be made since these need not be precise to demonstrate the
total United States supply picture.
Any analysis of the supply patterns that prevailed in 1965 could
include both the API and IOCC estimates. These patterns as related
to price are shown in Figure 2.
Current prices will permit the economic recovery of the API
"proved reserves" (31.5 billion barrels) plus that judged recoverable
from known fields by the IOCC (17.5 billion barrels). Current prices
are assumed to be in the price range of $2.83 to $3.19 that prevailed
over the period 1951-65 as expressed in 1965 dollars (see Figure 1).
If the price of oil rises above the upper limit of the 1951-65 price
range, it is assumed that it will become profitable to begin to extract
the oil termed "physically recoverable" by the IOCC. All of this oil
(21.5 billion barrels) can be supplied if the price of oil continues to
rise to the undetermined level indicated by a question mark on
Figure 2.
8. Lovejoy and Homan, Methods of Estimating Reserves of Crude Ol, Natural Gas and
Natural Gas Liquids (1965).
9. Interstate Oil Compact Commission, The Oil and Gas Compact Bulletin, V. 25, No. 2
(1966).
10. In 1966, the American Petroleum Institute also began to estimate potential recovery
from fields where secondary recovery equipment had not been installed; however, the
definitions used by these two groups are different.
11. Using the technology that was available in 1965.
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Figure 2.
PETROLEUM SUPPLY-PRICE RELATIONSHIP, 1965
- - -9II
I
I I I I

-J

0.
00

oD

~3.25-

00
0

CE)
4 0\

-

-/

\" -.
0
-\21
Supply sources:
-E>
.
re -0/American Petroleum Institute (API)
/0 20
X: 3.00
a_3O
LInterstate
.
3
Oil Compact Com\o -\/8
mission (10CC)
2.75

0

I ,
I I I I I
I
25
50
75
100
RECOVERABLE OIL (1965), billion bbl

125

Rising prices will also have another effect. At some point, it will
become profitable to begin to apply new technology, such as
miscible and in situ recovery, in field operations. Complete application of these methods to existing fields will supply an additional 40
billion barrels of oil.
Figure 2 really shows that supply depends upon price. At current
prices, the supply is about 49 billion barrels. If the price rises, an
additional 22 billion barrels can be added, making the cumulative
supply about 71 billion barrels. New technology will increase
cumulative supply to about 111 billion barrels.
The question of physical exhaustion of the nation's petroleum
supplies is not relevant to this analysis. The real question is the rate
at which new oil can be discovered or old discoveries converted to
the "proved reserve" category from the other categories depicted in
Figure 2. This can be done from domestic sources in only two ways:
(1) new discoveries, and (2) improved technology.
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C, Crude Oil Discovery
Exploration for oil in the United States reached a peak in the
mid-1950's and has fallen since. 1 2 These trends are quite pronounced, as can be seen in Figure 3. The most important aspects of
the situation are stated quite well in Interior's 1968 study:
The decline in drilling is notable for two reasons. It is not only the
longest in the history of the industry, but it has actually worsened
over the period 1964-67 which was marked by strong increases in
Figure 3.
CRUDE OIL DISCOVERY TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES
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12. For a comprehensive analysis of these trends see, National Petroleum Council, Factors Affecting U.S. Exploration, Development and Production 1946-65 (1967).
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demand, firmer prices for both crude oil and products, and a large
gain in wellhead revenue. The result has been one of the more noteworthy non sequiturs in the annals of petroleum economics. Within
the past three years, production of domestic crude oil has risen by
over one million barrels a day, and this gain would have been almost
as impressive even had the stimulus of the 1967 Middle East crisis
been absent. Annual revenue to producers from this source alone
accordingly increased by over a billion dollars between 1964 and
1967. Yet the response has been the extension of a drilling decline
already eight years in length to levels not reached in two decades.
Exploratory drilling in 1967 was off by 16 percent from what it had
been three years before, while new field wildcats lagged by 20 percent. Total
wells drilled declined by 22 percent during the same
1
period. 1
The rate of oil discovery (Figure 3) is an indicator of the maturity
of the petroleum industry. Note that oil findings for each foot drilled
or for each wildcat well have gradually declined and appear to have
stabilized in recent years. Concurrently, the cumulative oil contained
in these deposits reached a peak over 30 years ago and since then has
become progressively smaller (Table 2).
TABLE 2
Discovery History, United States

Giant Fields
Discovered
Decade
1870
1910
1920
1930
1940

to
to
to
to
to

1910 (4 decades)
1920
1930
1940
1950

1950 to 1960
1960 to 1966 (6 years)
Total

(Over 100 MMbbl)*

21
32
65
70
43

25
5
261

Source: Oil and Gas Journal, (August 22, 1966), pp. 150-151.

*Recoverable oil, 1965 conditions

These discovery trends reflect the law of diminishing returns in
action. That is, equal investments of capital will produce positive
results, but the returns become progressively smaller. In 1948, for
example, one wildcat well found over 2.0 million barrels of oil. By
1965, drilling one wildcat well produced a return of only about 1.0
million barrels.
The law of diminishing returns is a characteristic of any extractive
industry. For petroleum, it indicates a mature industry that is now
13. Interior (1968), supra note 2, at 18.
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well into the decline phase of its discovery cycle. Development of a
radically new exploration technique or tool could alter the rate at
which oil is discovered. However, exploration technology has been
evolutionary over the past 20-year period, and no major changes are
to be expected in the near future. Thus, the established discovery
trends will probably continue into the foreseeable future. Since there
are considerable quantities of oil waiting to be discovered, the
cumulative amount of new oil found could be increased sharply by
increasing the number of wells drilled. It will just take more drilling
to add a given amount of oil than it did during the heyday of the
industry, except principally for one new area-Northern Alaska.
1. Northern Alaska: New Oil Province
The big oil news of 1968 was the discovery of oil in the northernmost part of Alaska near the Arctic Circle. This discovery sparked
intense interest in this area as a potential source of new oil. Active
exploration has established that the potential reserves are huge, some
estimate 10 billion barrels or more, which would place these fields
high among the world's largest.
Oil in this area has been known to be present since 1944 when the
Navy began to develop its Naval Petroleum Reserve No. 4. One gasfield and the Umiat oilfield were found, but the full potential of the
area has never been adequately evaluated. Knowing that a large
potential exists and actually attempting to define and develop the
deposits are two different things. The intensity of the drive to develop this oil will be a function of the costs of extracting and transporting this oil to markets as compared to other supply alternatives.
Man has extended his search for oil into progressively more hostile
environments. The price he has paid for this invasion is reflected by
drilling costs (Table 3). Drilling on the North Slope presently costs
TABLE 3
Drilling Costs, United States
Location
On shore, Continental U.S.'
Offshore-Gulf of Mexico'
Alaska-Cook Inlet'
2
Alaska-North Slope
Joint Association Survey
"Newsweek, (January 6, 1969) p. 47

Cost/well, dollars
$

60,000
400,000
800,000
2,000,000

about 3,000 percent more than drilling a well in Texas or Oklahoma.
Such investments require that the amount of oil discovered be truly
large. It also means that only the biggest fields can be developed,
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thus the overall recovery will tend to be lower than in less costly
areas. 14
How to move the oil to markets has not yet been fully decided,
but submarines and/or tankers able to master ice are still under consideration. Plans have been announced to construct and operate by
1972 an 800-mile pipeline initially capable of transporting 500,000
barrels of oil per day. This will be an engineering feat, since both
terrain and extreme temperature swings must be conquered. But the
benefits to be gained by this $900 million venture should be carefully weighed against the costs to the natural ecological system of
that area.
In the Arctic, the natural balance between the environment and
the plant and animal systems is extremely fragile. The environment
has permitted the survival of only the hardiest plant and animal
species which are highly interdependent on each other for survival.
Man's intrusion in this area could upset the natural balance, thus
leading to a drastic change in the ecological system. Efforts to prevent this from occurring are being actively pursued.
Many of the popular stories written about Northern Alaska oil
assume that significant quantities will become almost instantly available. This is not probable if history is any guide to what can be
expected. Consider offshore Louisiana, for example. Oil was discovered here in the late 1940's. The forced development of the technology necessary to operate in this water environment began to
become available in the 1950's. In 1957, offshore Louisiana became
the most active exploration province in the United States, reaching
an alltime high in 1966. By 1968, 8,000 wells had been drilled and
$6 billion had been invested, yet the area contributes less than 10
percent of the nation's total production. This is significant, but it has
taken 12 years and immense capital expenditures. Furthermore, the
return on investment is said to be low by industry standards.
A supply area that will eventually be tied very closely to North
Slope oil is the Cook Inlet area of Alaska. This area became an active
exploration province in the mid-1950's. Total investment is estimated to be about $1 billion, but production and delivery to west
coast markets have been slow because of the lack of transportation.
Oil from this area is steadily increasing but accounted for less than 1
percent of the nation's total in 1968. The fact remains, however, that
it has taken over 10 years to begin to bring this oil to market in
significant quantities.
Cook Inlet oil, large increases in production from California fields
14. In addition, the extreme temperatures of 50'F below zero may make it difficult to
economically apply secondary recovery techniques.
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due to thermal stimulation, and the expected production from Santa
Barbara will all contribute to filling the gap between demand and
supply that now exists on the west coast. Inevitably, the transportation system will need to be extended to the mid continent or east
coast marketing areas.
Oil from northern Alaska may be needed in the future, but it will
not be instantly available or available at extremely low prices. One
estimate of wellhead costs' s (exclusive of taxes) is $1.00 to $1.20
per barrel. Transportation to west coast markets is estimated at
$0.60 per barrel and to mid-West and New York markets at $0.80 to
$1.00 per barrel. Thus, total production and delivery cost may range
from $1.60 to $2.20 per barrel. Others have contended, however,
that Alaskan oil will compete in price with Middle East oil. Whatever
the price, the rate of development will depend on the actual cost of
obtaining oil from Alaska as compared with other alternatives. Increased exploration in both offshore and onshore areas is one of
these alternatives. Another is to recover more oil from known deposits through improved technology.
D. Crude Oil Recover'
The earliest period of the petroleum industry was characterized by
a lack of understanding about how best to produce oil from a field.
As a result, many fields were abandoned following the cessation of
primary flush production. It has been estimated that the total production plus that which will be produced in the future from the
oilfields discovered between 1859 and 1919 will be equivalent to
only 25 percent of the total oil that was initially contained in
them.1 6
Subtantial improvements in oil recovery were made during the
1920-40 period with the discovery of many of the nation's major
natural water-drive fields (East Texas, for example). During this
period, principles of underground fluid behavior were established but
these principles were not practiced to any great extent in field operations.
Between 1940 and 1960, the overall trend was the discovery of
poorer quality oilfields which were not capable of yielding as high a
natural oil recovery as those discovered in the 1920-40 period. The
decline in reservoir quality, however, was offset by the introduction
of formation fracturing and the large-scale application of the earlier
established principles of how fluids flow in oil reservoirs.
A constantly improving production technology has permitted the
15. Jeremy Main, The Hot Oil Rush in Arctic Alaska, Fortune Apr. 1969, at 120.
16. National Petroleum Council, supra note 6.
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average recovery from a field to increase at an estimated annual rate
of about 0.5 percent over the past 20 years.'" This trend is due
mainly to the injection of water into oilfields to supplement or replace the natural energy of the field. Further evolutionary technology is currently, or will soon be, available' 8 and is expected to
enable a continued improvement in recovery at about the established
rate to 1980.
Many wish that this rate could be increased. It can be if the price
of oil rises to a point where more efficient methods such as miscible
recovery can be economically applied in field operations. However,
under the constraint that petroleum must remain competitive with
other energy sources, significant increases in the long run real price
of petroleum are not likely to occur. This constraint leaves the industry with one main course of action-constant improvement in the
recovery efficiency of waterflooding.' 9
Improvements are being made, but the types of oilfields now being
found are not as susceptible to this technique as those that were
found in the past. Improved technology applied to poorer quality
reservoirs will eventually act to slow the 0.5 percent annual improvement in recovery. Like exploration, advancing technology must also
respond to the law of diminishing returns.
E. Future Supplies = Discovery + Recovery
Increased discovery and improved technology acting together will
determine the rate at which new domestic supplies can be added to
oil reserves in the future. Several recent studies of this addition rate
have been made by independent groups within the Department of
the Interior. They usually start with a projection of future demand
similar to that described in the earlier part of this article. Once this
demand is established, the investigations generally follow one of
three approaches:
1. To develop mathematical expressions that represent established
discovery and recovery trends. These are then extrapolated a
reasonable distance into the future.
17. This increase in recovery due to technology is termed the "recovery factor." It is
calculated by adding the cumulative production with proved reserves at a given time and
dividing this sum by the total of the original oil in place found by that time.
18. Examples of this evolutionary technology are the injection of water in conjunction
with heat, chemical additives, and polymers. Also important are improved exploration,
drilling, and production technology applied to deeper producing horizoins or those located
offshore.

19. In 1965, oil production from water injection projects accounted for about onefourth of all of the oil produced in the nation. By 1980, about one-third is expected to be
produced by this method.
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2. To assume that future demands will be met with supply responses
as has happened in the past. Using the projection of future demand as a known, historical demand-supply patterns are then
used to estimate the unknown, future supplies.
3. To estimate future supply levels by analysis of a number of physical and economic factors. Among these factors are the footage
drilled, finding rates, and price of oil.
All three techniques have been used to estimate reserves of
petroleum in 1980. These estimates are in surprisingly good agreement (Table 4). The main disagreement occurs when the results of
TABLE 4
Various Estimates of 1980
Domestic Recoverable Reserves
Recoverable Reserves, Billion Barrels
Method'
1
2
3

Initial

Source of Projected Data
Office of Oil and Gas
Bureau of Mines
(headquarters
estimate)
Bureau of Mines
(field station
estimate)

Projected

31.0 on 1/1/65

29.5 on 1/1/80

31.4 on 12/31/65

31.0 on 12/31/80

31.4 on 12/31/65

32.8 on 12/31/80

Source: American Petroleum Institute.
'See text

these approaches are interpreted-the subject of the next section of
this article.
III

DEMAND-SUPPLY BALANCES
relationships for petroleum are traced in
demand-supply
Historical
Figure 4A. A common way of expressing these data is to divide
supply by demand (Figure 4B).
Since supply is the API concept of "proved reserves" and domestic
demand is production for any given year, the value obtained when
supply is divided by production is called the reserve-production
(R/P) ratio.' 0 It is the R/P ratio that many mistakenly use to predict
how many years of petroleum supplies remain to be produced. This
ratio really measures the oil that is relatively certain to be produced
at current real prices and technology. Increases in the real price or
technologic breakthroughs or both will enable the economic recovery
20. The R/P ratio is calculated by dividing the API reserves reported for the end of any
year by the production during that year.
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Figure 4A.
HISTORICAL DEMAND-SUPPLY BALANCES
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Figure 4B.
RESERVE-PRODUCTION RATIO TRENDS

of billions of barrels of additional oil without the need to drill
another exploratory well.
The historical trends between demand and supply show that each
increased by about the same proportions until the mid-1950's. This
balance is reflected by the relatively constant R/P ratio that ranged
between 14 and 12 to 1. In the mid-1950's, reserves began to level
off at between 30 and 32 billion barrels, but demand continued
upward. This divergence caused the R/P ratio to nose downward,
breaking the established historical patterns. It is this changing de-
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mand-supply balance that has evoked growing concern by those who
analyze those trends. Why has it changed? The answer to this question is complicated owing to changes in government regulations and
in the character of newly discovered oilfields. However, the single
most important change over the past 20 years has been the widespread application of improved recovery technology.
A. Inventory Liquidations
Fracturing the reservoir rocks and supplementing natural reservoir
energy has made it possible to produce oil not only more efficiently,
but at a much faster rate. This latter trend shows up very clearly in
all studies that relate well capacity to other factors. For example,
between 1948 and 1965 the number of producing wells, total production, and proved reserves each increased by about 35 percent.
The ability to deliver oil to the surface, however, increased more
than 120 percent. This increase far outstripped the nation's ability to
consume the oil, resulting in enormous amounts of excess capacity
(37 percent of the capacity to produce oil was not used in 1965).
The growth in capacity is compared to actual production in Figure 5.
Note how closely the growth in production capacity is related to the
number of operating fluid injection projects. The industry's efforts
to reduce the amount of unused capacity are being successful as
shown by the rounding and decline in the productive capacity curve
between 1964 and 1968. The growth and decline in unused capacity
is shown more clearly in Table 5. As indicated, unused capacity grew
continuously from essentially zero in 1948 to its peak of 37 percent
in 1964. By 1968, it had fallen to 24 percent.
Without fluid injection and fracturing it was probably necessary to
maintain an R/P ratio that historically ranged between 14 and 12 to
1. With the application of technology, the need to maintain these
historic ratios no longer exists. Like many industries, the petroleum
industry was able to make substantial savings by carrying a smaller
product inventory. The phenomenon that has reduced the R/P ratio
by 20 percent in recent years represents a liquidation of excess inventories which there is no economic reason to maintain. 2 1
No one knows for sure when this liquidation will stop. For
purpose of this study, however, an answer can be given within
reasonable limits.
21. Other interrelated factors are often cited as the reason for decline. Among the most
important of these include increased new oil supplies from imports which reduced the need
for domestic production, prorationing regulations which encouraged over development, and
a general softening of prices after 1957. All of these contributed to the great growth in
excess capacity.
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Figure 5.
PRODUCTION, PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY, AND FLUID INJECTION PROJECTS

TABLE 5
Production and Production Capacity
Production,'
Year

million b/d

Production capacity, 2

Percent of

million b/d

capacity unused3

1948
5.520
5.520
1950
5.400
6.727
1952
6.256
7.465
1953
6.485
8.331
1956
7.151
9.867
1959
7.054
10.585
1963
7.542
11.590
1964
7.612
12.107
1967
8.810
12.287
1968
9.120
12.055
'Bureau of Mines; production during the year.
2
National Petroleum Council; end-of-year estimate.
3 Unused capacity = [(production capacity-production) /production capacity] x

0
20
16
23
28
33
35
37
28
24

100.
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B. The 1971 to 1976 PivotalPeriod
For this answer, it is necessary to determine a level where the
liquidation should be terminated and the then-existing levels maintained. Some studies of this level have been made, but no one level
has been selected as the optimum.
If the R/P ratio were to fall to a level as low as 5 to 1, the nation
would have to remove about 20 percent of its reserves in 1 year. This
may not be physically possible without causing excessive and irreparable damage to the producing formations. In addition, spare capacity
for emergencies would be nonexistent.
Rather than this very low ratio, it is generally agreed that the
desirable R/P ratio is about 822 or 92" to 1, which should leave
some spare capacity for emergencies. Accepting 8 or 9 to I as a
criterion, it is necessary to estimate when the current trends will
carry the R/P ratio to these levels. The medium domestic demand
estimate from Table 1 (4.645 billion barrels) and the average supply
estimate from Table 4 (31.0 billion barrels) have been used to prepare the "best" estimate of future R/P trends (Figure 6). As shown,
the desirable R/P ratio will most likely be reached in the period 1971
to 1976. The bounds on the 1971-76 pivotal time estimate, established through sensitivity and contingency analysis, indicate that the
desirable level could be reached as early as 1970 or as late as 1985.
The actual R/P ratios recorded after the cutoff point for historical
data (to 1965) are also plotted on Figure 6. The actual data fall
below the "pessimistic" estimate. This does not mean that the
analysis is incorrect since the R/P ratio does move erratically and
seldom follows an ideal straight prediction curve. The eventual reclassification of the Alaskan discoveries from the "probable" to the
"proved" category will probably force the R/P ratio to fall within
the boundaries of the original prediction. However, these data indicate that projections need constant revision to adjust to changing
conditions. This is particularly so during this transition period of
rapid changes.
Transition normally implies a change between two other phases,
all of which have unique characteristics that can be described. These
characteristics cannot be delineated very precisely, but it is possible
to begin to grossly classify them using the data previously presented.
C. Three Phases of Change
1. Phase I Pivotal Period (1962-65) This is the period when the
22. Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, An Assessment of Available Information on Energy in the United States, Doc. No. 159, 87th Cong. 2nd Sess. 302 (1962).
23. Conalez, How Big a Task is Ahead for the Petroleum Industry, Oil and Gas Journal
101, May 15, 1967, at 101.
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petroleum industry's operating changes begin to take effect. Excess
productive capacity reached a peak of 37 percent, and the R/P ratio
moved below its old maintenance level of about 12 to 1. The allowable production from Texas wells (a bellwether indicator of change),
which had fallen from 70 percent during the Korean conflict, begins
to firm at about 25 percent. Prices of oil stop eroding and also begin
to firm.
2. Phase II Transition Period (1966-70) Increasing production
and falling production capacity cause the unused productive capacity
to be significantly reduced from 37 percent in 1964 to 24 percent in
1968.24 The R/P ratio fell sharply, and both prices and Texas allowables advanced. By early 1969, prices were near their 1957 peak and
Texas allowables had climbed from 25 to over 50 percent. Exploration and development should soon begin to increase as the R/P ratio
nears its new maintenance level.
3. Phase III Pivotal Period (1971-76) The R/P ratio will enter its
new maintenance level of 8 or 9 to 1. Efforts to stabilize this new
balance will probably include oil from Northern Alaska, but other
supply alternatives are available as outlined below. The price of oil
will be determined by how well the industry is able to develop these
sources.
IV
SUPPLY ALTERNATIVES
Technology, exploration, liquids from solid organic matter, and
increased prices and imports are alternative ways of assuring that
future oil needs are met. Assuming that petroleum will remain competitive with other energy sources, however, assumes that there will
be no significant long run increases in its real price. Variations in the
amount of oil imported into this country were treated as a contingency in developing future demand-supply balances, but no major
2
changes in this program can be expected in the immediate future. s
Without significant changes in price and the level of imports, oil
firms will be faced with a choice of either developing conventional
crude oil or extracting liquid products from supplemental sources
such as oil shale, coal, and tar sands. Prospects for parallel development routes are excellent.
The application of evolutionary technology in field operations will
continue. But without real price increases or technologic break24. In addition, the low drilling rates have affected natural gas reserves which in 1968
registered their first decline since records were first kept in 1946.
25. After an exhaustive cabinet level review of the oil import question and extensive
public debate, President Nixon, in 1970, decided to retain a modified quota system for
controlling foreign oil imports.
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throughs, the most efficient of the recovery methods now available
(miscible recovery and underground combustion) cannot be economically used in field operations. Therefore, the rate of improvement in recovery efficiency from known reservoirs can be expected
to advance in the future no faster than it has in the past.
The cost of increased exploration needed to maintain an adequate
reserve position from 1965 to 1980 has been estimated to be $10
billion in drilling and equipping cost alone.' 6 The size of this expenditure has prompted the Government to ask: ". . . [j] ust how earnestly the oil industry may be expected to pursue such costly ventures
if available alternatives exist..."2 7
Each of the supplemental sources has vast quantities of solid organic materials that are convertible to liquid products. The oil contained in these deposits is not measured in billions as is petroleum,
but in hundreds of billions and trillions of barrels of oil equivalent.
Many factors will govern the use of these sources.
Coal, for example, is found close to major markets and would have
a relatively small waste disposal problem. Disposal of waste is a factor in oil shale development, but it probably has the lowest capital
investment requirement and highest return on investment of any of
the supplemental sources. Tar sands are located primarily in Canada
and their development for consumption in the United States must be
considered in relation to the oil imports program and balance-ofpayments policy.
Most recent studies show that each supplemental source is nearly
competitive with crude petroleum using technology currently available. 2 8 Moreover, these processes involve large-scale material handling which lend themselves to the technological breakthroughs that
lead to substantial cost reductions.2 9 Scaling up from the current
stage of technology to multi-billion dollar industries will require several years to plan both the industry and supporting communities. In
30
addition, enormous commitments of capital will be required.
26. Supra note 2, at 19.
27. Id.
28. For an overall review, see Cameron, A Comparative Study of Oil Shale, Tar Sands
and Coal as Sources of Oil, 21 J. Petroleum Technology V. 253 (Mar. 1969).
29. The Department of Interior's comprehensive Prospects for Oil Shale Development,
May 1968, for example, estimates that current technology will enable shale oil production
for $2.98 per barrel. This will yield a discounted return on investment of about 12 percent.
By 1980, advanced technology will lower this production ost from $2.98 to $1.58 per
barrel, enabling a 20-percent discounted return plus substantial returns to the Government
through increased land values.
30. Capital investments will range from $2,000 to about $4,500 per daily barrel of
production. Thus a 1 million barrel-per-day industry using any of the supplemental sources
will require capital investments of from $2 billion to $4.5 billion. This size of industry will
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The alternative that proves to be most economical will depend on
the unique positions of individual firms as they evaluate their reserve
position and future needs. Many firms will meet their needs through
exploration and development, and others will begin to move toward
the development of alternative sources.
Potential single-firm entrance into oil shale development was
analyzed by Mead. 3 1 Heading his list was Atlantic-Richfield which
has been steadily increasing its holdings of oil shale, coal, and tar
sands resources even though it is a leader in Alaskan North Slope
development. In March 1969, Atlantic-Richfield became the fourth
partner in Colony Development Corp. This move links the financial
strength of Atlantic-Richfield and its marketing outlets to that of
another oil company, Standard of Ohio, with a firm that specializes
in mining (Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co.). The other partner, The Oil
Shale Corp., holds patents to one of the three processes thought to
be commercially usable for oil shale processing."2 This combination
provides all of the ingredients for the commercial extraction and
marketing of shale oil.
By contrast, very large oil companies are absent from Mead's list
of potential entrants to oil shale development. This probably reflects
the very high reserve-to-production ratios held by these companies.
Thus, parallel routes will be taken to assure future supplies as
individual firms analyze their reserve positions relative to future
needs. The cumulative actions of these firms will begin to be seen
prior to the 1971-1976 period as the R/P ratio enters the 8 or 9 to 1
maintenance level.
The current stage of technology, the size of the capital investments required to develop supplemental sources as compared to
alternative investment opportunities (Alaska and offshore drilling),
and the planning and the required long lead times suggest that oil
production from any of the supplemental sources will not be a significant part of total supplies until after 1975. Thus, the rates at
which new oil reserves are found and recovery is increased from
known oilfields will determine how well the industry will be able to
once again stabilize the demand-supply relationship. These rates will
be directly related to the pressure that may be created for higher
prices and more foreign imports.
If sufficient quantities of new oil cannot be added to reserves,
be small by future standards. One million barrels per day in 1980, for example, represents
only 8 percent of the estimated domestic production.
31. Mead, The Structure of the Buyer Market for Oil Shale Resources, 8 Natural Resources J. 609 (1968).
32. The others being those developed by Union Oil Company of California and the
Bureau of Mines.
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intense short-run pressure will develop for increased imports and/or
for higher real prices to enable the economic recovery of physically
recoverable supplies. This is a real possibility because of the evolutionary nature of recovery and exploration technology and the lead
time required to develop Alaskan oil. Over the long run, however, oil
from supplemental sources will set an upper limit on crude oil prices,
or force it lower if its real price has risen relative to that of the other
energy commodities.
V
PETROLEUM POLICY
One of the special characteristics of energy that sets it apart from
other sectors of the economy is the substitutability of energy sources
at the point of use. It matters little to a consumer if his electricity
for heat and power is generated from coal, oil, natural gas, hydropower, or nuclear energy. And liquid fuels and gases can be made not
only from petroleum, but also from coal, oil shale, and tar sands.
Technically, only a few percent of energy use is not susceptible to
substitution.
Because of this special characteristic, all energy commodities compete vigorously for a share of the energy market. How well each is
able to compete is determined largely by its price relative to that of
all other commodities." Since the price of petroleum is indirectly
controlled through public policies of the Federal and State Governments, the use of this commodity is also influenced to a great extent.
Programs dealing with imports, prorationing, tax treatment, and
leasing are all major policies that affect petroleum demand and supply, and the energy sources with which it competes. The wisdom of
continuing many of these programs in their present forms is being
vigorously challenged on economic grounds.
A. Current Policies
1. Foreign Imports
The import program of the Federal Government limits the amount
of foreign oil that can enter the country. It has served to assure the
nation a secure petroleum supply but only at an added cost since,
historically, foreign crude could be delivered to east coast markets
for about $1.40 per barrel less than comparable domestic crude.
Adelman has calculated that this program costs about $2 billion
33. Other factors are also important, such as equipment cost and convenience, but price
is the overriding determinant.
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dollars each year. 4 While there are some economic problems with
his analysis, 3 it is true that the American public does pay an added
price for secure petroleum supplies from domestic sources.
2. Prorationing
State prorationing of oil also limits oil supplies and was designed
to provide incentives for exploration and to increase ultimate recovery from older productive fields. In practice, this program also
supports prices by limiting supplies to meet expected demands. In
addition, the oil that would be the least costly to produce is rationed
to furnish a market for partially depleted, lower productive wells.
Prorationing does prevent physical waste of petroleum, but the
annual cost of the program is estimated to be about $2 billion. 6
3. Taxes
Tax provisions that favor the industry were designed to provide
economic incentives to stimulate exploration and development of
new oil reserves. However, a study prepared for the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) has concluded that the 27 percent depletion allowance is a relatively inefficient method to encourage exploration.3 '
They have estimated that elimination of this allowance would increase tax revenues by about $1.2 billion each year and result in a
decline in crude oil reserves of about 3 percent.
Tax policies that relate to oil shale could serve to greatly stimulate
the development of that resource. At present, the depletion allowance is 15 percent applied to the mined ore. This is equivalent to a
tax allowance of about 5 cents per barrel of shale oil and would help
provide an oil shale industry with a marginally attractive return on
investment of about 12 percent. A decision to treat oil from shale
the same as crude petroleum (27 2-percent depletion allowance on
the shale oil) would raise the 5 cent per barrel allowance to about
35-40 cents per barrel, thereby greatly enhancing the overall return
on investment. 8
4. Public Land Leasing
State and federal laws control the access to public lands that contain many of the largest and richest deposits of energy resources that
34. M. Adelman, Efficiency of Resource Use in Crude Petroleum, 31 Southern Economic
J. 101 (1964).
35. E. Shaffer, Oil Import Program of the United States: An Evaluation, at 219.
36. Adelman, supra note 34.
37. U.S. Congress, House, Tax Reform Studies and ProposalsU.S. Treasury Department,
91st Congress, 1st Session, 1969.
38. The 1969 tax legislation changed the point of application from the mined shale to 15
percent on the produced shale-oil; increasing the tax allowance to about 12 cents per barrel.
The same legislation also reduced the depletion allowance on petroleum to 22 percent.
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remain in this country. The production history of oil and gas from
federal lands makes this abundantly clear. From 1945 through 1955,
oil and gas from federal lands accounted for only 2 to 6 percent of
domestic production. Production rose rapidly due to the development of the outer continental shelf. By 1968, 16 percent of all the
oil and 13 percent of all the gas were produced from federal offshore
leases.
In addition to oil and gas, much of the nation's available deposits
of oil shale, tar sands, coal, uranium, and thorium are on public
lands. Leasing policies can be made to control not only the quantity
of energy products that can be extracted, but also which sources will
be developed. The rate and types of lands released for development
may dominate future energy resource patterns.
B. Reform Movement
It is quite apparent that agitation for policy reform is currently at
a fever point. The industry, state, and federal regulatory agencies,
and Congress are all calling for different types of policy reforms.
Indeed, the percentage depletion allowance appears to have become
the major target that must fall before tax reforms in a multitude of
other areas are made.
In such an environment, it is quite easy to lose sight of the
progress that has been made toward economic efficiency. Lovejoy
and Homan, however, recognize this progress and stress that from an
economic viewpoint:
[01 il-conservation regulation has undoubtedly made a significant
contribution to oil conservation in the economic sense when compared with what would most likely have happened in the absence of
any sort of regulation. We should also like to note that there have
been significant advances in the direction of what we call economic
efficiency, particularly since 1950. 3 9
Many studies of economic efficiency lack validity because they are
based on hindsight. They serve to point out what could have been
accomplished, but they often are not relevant to the future. Studies
such as that prepared for the IRS on depletion allowances are not
adequate for use in drafting changes that will affect the petroleum
industry in the future. The IRS study was based largely on data
covering the early 1960's and the 1960's will not be anything like the
1970's.
This study has shown that petroleum supplies are being liquidated,
39. W. Lovejoy and P. Homan, Economic Aspects of Oil Conservation Regulation, at 263
(1967).
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and that a new demand supply balance will soon be reached. Efforts
to maintain this balance will be reflected by marked upswings in
exploratory drilling, increased application of recovery technology,
and initial attempts to extract liquids from solid organic matter.
These will require larger capital expenditures than were needed in the
1960's. In addition, the removal of sulfur from petroleum and application of technology to liquid disposal and oil pollution problems
will require increasingly more capital. Yet to be completely evaluated
are suggested changes in refining techniques in the manufacturing of
gasoline that would be helpful in reducing air pollution caused by
internal-combustion engines.
What is needed are not more studies based on past data, but use of
these data to realistically reflect future needs of the industry for the
capital required to provide both quantity of supplies and quality of
the environment.4 The economic studies of past rewards to this
industry do point out the magnitude of the annual savings that may
occur in the future, and such savings are worth going after. But it
cannot be done in a haphazard, disconnected way. Lovejoy and
Homan point out about the petroleum industry that:
As matters now stand, an extremely complex production and
market structure has been built upon the basis of regulatory ground
rules which, in many respects, do not conform to the requirements
of economic efficiency. There is, however, no easy way to achieve
such conformity. An industrial structure is an organic thing, not
something that can be taken apart and reassembled to the heart's
desire. Policy starts from where you are and is limited by what can
be done to modify, without destroying, the organism. When dealing
with what Professor John R. Commons called "going concerns," the
procedure is to identify the nature of a 4problem and to devise the
practicable means to some definable ends. 1
The way out of this dilemma is not easy, but neither is it impossible.
C Policy Reform
Problems of changes are enormous. The vested interests in the
status quo in both the private and public sectors and the conflicting
goals of regulatory agencies are major hurdles toward any future
changes.
The political environment is doing wonders to erode the status
quo, but it does little toward the resolution of mutually incom40. Such a study has been completed and was released during 1970 as a Bureau of Mines
Information Circular 8472, ChangingInvestment Patterns of the U.S. Petroleum Industry,
1950-1968, by Harry R. Johnson.
41. Lovejoy and Homan, supra note 39, at 264.
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patible goals. For example, security of supply is paid for by limiting
entry of low-cost foreign supplies, prorationing supports high prices,
and removal of sulfur from oil costs more than leaving it in.
The key to any change is to get all planners to perceive the need
for economic efficiency balanced against other desirable goals. If this
can be accomplished, the goals to be obtained can be developed in a
way that is quantifiable and constrained only by such noneconomic
factors as national security and environmental quality. This will require a whole array of data not now available, and new methods of
evaluation will need to be developed.
Probably the most difficult problem will be to conceptualize and
implement new administrative approaches. Responsibilities for oil
and gas matters are now divided between at least a dozen federal
departments and agencies, plus about as many congressional committees. In addition, 32 states produce oil, all 50 consume it and exert
some influence on demand and supply. Further complications arise
when legislative or executive orders are tested in the courts.
All groups who deal with petroleum matters seek to optimize
some goal, but no one group has the responsibility for overall coordination of these activities. Such coordination can take several
forms, including (1) a new agency concerned only with energy, (2)
an effective interdepartmental council to coordinate energy policy,
and/or (3) contractual agreements between existing agencies. By
realigning role relationships at both the federal and state levels, it
would be possible to develop a system where one group emerges able
to (1) account for all interrelated energy commodities, and (2) consider all alternatives and directly or indirectly influence all policy
decisions related to petroleum. The goal of such a group would be to
assure an adequate flow of liquid petroleum into the economy at
reasonable costs. The "adequate flow" concept is new and just beginning to appear in some government documents.4 2
This concept can be described as a continuously changing pipeline
with one end feeding oil into the national economy. The oil inventory contained in the line would be just enough to assure maximum
economic efficiency with adequate surplus capacity to meet emergency conditions. Into the main pipeline are numerous feeder lines
that represent alternative means of supplying oil-exploration, technology, imports, and supplemental sources. The valves that control
these feeder lines represent public policies-prorationing, import program, tax incentives, and leasing policy. Such a system can only be
controlled if one agency is big enough to directly or indirectly adjust
42. C. Mottley, Strategic Planning, Management Highlights, U.S. Department of the Interior Release No. 56, at 1 (1967).
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all of the valves in sufficient time to enable the main pipeline to
remain continuously full. Air bubbles may form if this is not accomplished and lead to temporary shortages of oil, forcing the price of
oil upward.
Comprehensive planning does not mean master plans that can be
developed and then forgotten. Since no one can adequately project
very far into the future, optimum very long term plans may need to
be sacrificed for shorter, second best solutions. The objective is not
to become permanently locked into one course of action, but to take
actions from which one can become disengaged. Flexibility is needed
to continuously adjust plans to changing technology and future
needs. Of course, a single group that can carry out such a task does
not now exist. But steps toward greater economic efficiency can
begin to be implemented using existing organizational arrangements.
Lovejoy and Homan list a number of thoughtful suggestions
toward this end.4 3 These deal primarily with means that could be
used to eliminate excess capacity and range from a soil-bank type
program to the future abandonment or restriction of marginal wells.
Their work is aimed at the future, not what has happened in the past.
It is possible to make the right decision, but at exactly the wrong
time. And during this period of inventory liquidation, decisions out
of phase with reality could remove capital just when it will be needed
to maintain the future balance between demand and supply. This is
extremely dangerous since it could lead to excessive inventory
liquidations that will draw unused productive capacity below a level
adequate to meet emergency conditions. This must not be allowed to
happen, and foresight and planning will assure that it does not.
SUMMARY

The petroleum industry operates within the framework of two
distinct systems. The first of these is the competitive system where
economics and technology largely govern the action of any firm
seeking to maximize its profits. Options available to any firm, however, are constrained by a system of public policies superimposed
over the competitive system. It is these two systems working together that make analysis of the petroleum industry extremely complex.
Future demand for petroleum forms the basis for rational judgments concerning its adequacy and price. The demand for petroleum
is expected to grow at about 3 percent compounded annually. This
growth rate indicates that the nation will consume in 1965-1980
about as much oil as it consumed in the 105-period from 1859 to
43. Lovejoy and Homan, supra note 39, at 268-71.
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1964. In the face of such huge future demands, the petroleum industry has made significant operating changes that are reflected by a
sharply falling balance between total supply and demand.
These adjustments were made in response to changes in the competitive system. The widespread application of improved recovery
technology has made it profitable to hold less of a product inventory, thus eliminating the need to maintain historical supply-demand
balances. A new balance will most likely be reached in the period
1971-76. Indications that this level is rapidly being approached at the
present time (1969) are (1) a shrinking of excess productive capacity
and (2) the upward movement of oil prices and allowable production
from wells located in Texas and other states. How well the industry
is able to maintain this new supply-demand balance depends largely
on advancing technology and exploration.
Petroleum discovery trends are characteristic of a mature extractive industry well into the decline stage of its discovery cycle.
Exceptions for this are some offshore areas and Northern Alaska, but
oil from the Arctic will require time and large capital expenditures to
develop. Recovery technology is evolutionary in nature and can be
expected to advance no faster in the future than it has in the past.
Liquid products from coal, oil shale, and tar sands are now nearly
competitive with crude petroleum. However, the planning and capital
required to develop these sources indicates that none of them will
contribute significantly to total supplies until after 1975.
Over the short run, the petroleum industry's ability to maintain a
new balance between supply and demand will depend largely on its
ability to find and develop domestic sources. It is possible that
pressure may build for increased imports and/or higher real prices of
petroleum to permit more exploration and the economic recovery of
the substantial quantities of physically recoverable oil that now exist.
Over the long run, oil from the supplemental sources will set an
upper limit on crude oil prices, or even force them lower.
Imports, prorationing, tax treatment, and land leasing are major
government policies which affect petroleum demand and supply.
Many people are calling for reform of these programs, but reform can
best proceed by simultaneous adjustment of all programs. This can
only be successful if one group emerges that can adequately anticipate future energy needs and is big enough to directly or indirectly
influence all major petroleum policy decisions. The goal of this
activity is to provide an adequate flow of petroleum into the economy at reasonable costs. Failure to simultaneously reform the
present government policies could lead to a dangerous over-correction of the falling balance between supply and demand.

